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Reverence for Life
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desires and appraisals. 2 According to human-centered
(anthropocentric) ethics, only humans have inherent
worth. Other natural objects have value only because
humans value them, whether instrumentally or
intrinsically. Things have instrumental value when
they are useful to humans. For example, drinkable
water, breathable air, and natural medicines have
instrumental value because they contribute to the
further good of health. Things have intrinsic value
when they are pleasing because of their aesthetic or
symbolic properties, as when we value wilderness
areas and bald eagles because of their beauty and
community significance.
Non-human-centered ethics locates inherent worth
in natural things in addition to humans. In particular,
biocentric ethics locates inherent worth in living things.
Although Schweitzer did not explicitly use the distinction between inherent worth versus intrinsic value, it is
clear he defended a biocentric ethics that locates
inherent value in all living things: all life is "sacred"
and "something possessing value in itself."(C 57)3
Theories of environmental ethics also differ
according to whether they are individualistic or holistic
in approach. Thus, bioeentric theories are individualistic
when they locate inherent worth in particular organisms.
They are holistic when they locate inherent worth in
communities of life (ecosystems), in types of life
(species), or in the environment as a whole. Schweitzer

Albert Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life is more
complex and interesting than fIrst appears. It contains
themes relevant to contemporary environmental ethics,
including a virtue-ethics approach that emphasizes
personal responsibility and tolerance, empathy for living
organisms, and the fundamental unity of life. Not
surprising, then, Schweitzer has recently been
acknowledged for pioneering a biocentric (lifecentered) ethical theory.l
At the same time, Schweitzer's ethic has four
unpalatable features: pantheism, anthropomorphism,
excessive subjectivity, and guilt mongering. I trace these
features to the metaphysical framework in which
Schweitzer develops his ideal of reverence for life. I
also show how the framework can be set aside while
retaining much of the spirit and substance of his ethics.
My aim is not to defend his ethics, but to interpret it
and show its contemporary relevance.
I. Unity of Life (without Pantheism)

PHILOSOPHY

Theories of environmental ethics differ according to
their conceptions of what things have inherent worth,
that is, value in themselves and independently ofhuman
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to set the metaphysics aside, at least the part of it which

bridges the dichotomy between individualistic and
holistic bioethics. He insists that each living organism
has inherent worth, yet at the same time his primary
theme is the unity of life. This moral and spiritual unity
is ultimately unfathomable, which is why he calls his
theory ethical mysticism. This is an "active mysticism"
that inspires commitments to further life, by contrast
with "passive mysticism" centered on emotional
experiences of identity with God or nature.(C 79)
Schweitzer renounced metaphysics in the sense of
a search for an ultimate purpose of the universe that
gives meaning to humanity.(C 73) The meaning of our
lives is created through personal commitments, not
discovered through cosmic speculation. Nevertheless,
Schweitzer did hold a metaphysical theory in the sense
of a view of ultimate reality, and that theory forms the
framework in which he develops his theme of life's
unity. He maintained a faith in a universal, infinite, and
creative Will-to-live.(C 79) Much of the time this faith
remained in the background, but it surfaced periodically,
as in this passage: "Reverence for life means to be in
the grasp of the infinite, inexplicable, forward-urging
Will in which all Being is grounded."(C 283)4
Schweitzer was influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer's
voluntarist metaphysics according to which ultimate
reality is will. "Behind all phenomena" there is will-tolive, and each organism constitutes part of that will-a
will to both survive and to develop according to its
natural tendencies.(C 308, 282) Unlike Schopenhauer,
Schweitzer was deeply religious, though his religious
convictions were highly unorthodox. They hovered
somewhere near pantheism but were closer to
biotheism-the view that God is manifested in and
constituted by all life. 5 By the time he wrote The
Philosophy of Civilization Schweitzer was most likely
an agnostic concerning supernatural beings (God,
angels, souls), even though he continued to use
conventional religious language when speaking as a
minister and theologian. The divine is immanent in
nature rather than transcendent to it: "The Essence of
Being, the Absolute, the Spirit of the Universe, and all
similar expressions denote nothing actual. .. , The only .
reality is the Being which manifests itself in
phenomena."(C 304)
Schweitzer's metaphysics has some interest. It
shares a kinship with the worldviews of Spinoza,
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Native American religions.
Perhaps its greatest value lies in bridging Christian
orthodoxy and naturalistic worldviews. Even so, I wish
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suggests there is a cosmic and semi-deified Will-to-live
that can be said to act creatively in the universe. What
then remains of the theme of life's moral unity?
Abandoning Schweitzer's metaphysics need not
mean rejecting his ethics.6 I offer three preliminary
observations. First, Schweitzer is the first to remind us
that the core of a moral outlook can survive intact after
being freed from the worldview in which it was first
developed. In The Quest of the Historical Jesus he
argues that Jesus held a false eschatology which
anticipated the end of the world during his lifetime. That
eschatology led to some unjustified value judgments,
including a pessimistic renunciation of human society
as a mere overture to the approaching kingdom of God.
Nevertheless, Schweitzer embraces Jesus as a moral
paragon whose ideal of love can be transplanted from
the metaphysics in which it was initially formulated.
I suggest the same is true of Schweitzer's ideal of
reverence for life.
Second, Schweitzer insists that ethics cannot be
inferred from metaphysics. In particular, the ideal of
reverence for life cannot be derived from observing
nature's spectacle of killing. Schweitzer prides himself
on being "absolutely skeptical" about cosmic purposes
while maintaining an optimistic and life-affirming
attitude.(C 76) As I have suggested, he is not as
metaphysically skeptical as he claims, since he
continues to assume there is a unified and universal
Will-to-live manifested in all life. Nevertheless, setting
aside his metaphysics is consistent with the spirit ofhis
largely empirical-oriented "natural ethic."(L 235)
Third, Schweitzer's metaphysics distorts some of
his most important ideas. For example, in the next
section I show how his central argument for the ideal
of reverence for life is cogent only when freed from its
metaphysical moorings. Even the central theme of the
unity of life is better appreciated without relying on
metaphysical speculations. When Schweitzer urged in
his sermons, "Wherever you see life-that is yourself!,"
he evoked responses that were not dependent on his
parishioners being pantheists.(R 115)
We might understand the unity-of-life theme as
drawing together a rich variety of familiar experiences
and facts, including the following.
1. Compassion is a natural response to the suffering
of other people and animals, a response which
Schweitzer felt in extraordinary degrees from
childhood on. 7 He was ahead of his time in calling
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for humane treatment of animals in medical
experiments and food production.(C 318)
2. We have benefited in many ways from animals,
including the suffering inflicted on animals in
medical experiments. Because of this "a new and
special relation of solidarity has been established
between them and uS."(C 318)
3. Caring in the animal world is often strikingly
analogous to human caring, and both have a
biological origin. Just as humans care for their
children, many species of animals care for their
offspring and even for animals outside their kinship groups. In citing such examples Schweitzer
anticipates the insights of sociobiologists about
the genetic basis for human and nonhuman
caring.(L 237-9, C 224-6)
4. With many individual animals we can enter into
reciprocal caring relationships, indeed "friendship
with animals."g
5. Plants, animals, and humans interact in complex
chains of interdependency. We are united with
nature in that our very survival depends on those
interdependencies being sustained.(L 237)
6. We experience moments of awe in which we
marvel at the sheer existence of life and the infinite
diversity of living creatures.(R 114-5)
7. We also experience moments of humility when
we understand that humanity is but one of millions
of fragile life forms and not the final goal of the
universe.(L 226)
8. The competition and killing defining the food chain
are not the only significant aspects of nature.
Equally noteworthy is the cooperation and
tolerance which have evolved as part of the shared
struggle to survive.(C 260)
The moral implications of these experiences need
to be sorted out and considered separately. Nevertheless,
they have a cumulative impact in moving us toward a
sense of oneness with nature of a sort aptly conveyed
in the phrase "reverence for life"-reverence for life as
a whole, as well as for particular organisms.

2. It focuses on self-perfection, where complete selfperfection implies bringing our lives into a positive
relationship with the universe and with life as a
whole.(C 57, 296)
3. It is optimistic in the sense of evoking positive
committnents on behalf of civilization, which
consists in progress of all kinds, and it evokes steady
and enthusiastic committnent by tapping into our
most basic sources of motivation.(C xiii, 107)
4. It avoids metaphysical assumptions about the
ultimate purposes of the universe.(C 76)
Surveying the history of ethics, Schweitzer argues
that the ethic of reverence for life meets these criteria
better than competing theories. His arguments,
however, turn substantially on personal factors about
how the ideal of reverence for life brings selffulfillment through service to others.(C 255)
Alternative moral theories generate greater motivation
and self-fulfillment for some individuals, and from a
modern pluralistic point of view it is misguided to call
for "a single ideal of civilized man."(C 47) In any case,
something more is needed to justify reverence for life
than the four general criteria.
The "something more" is Schweitzer's famous willto-live argument. (C 308-311, 0155-158, L 227-229).
The argument is easily ridiculed because it seems to
depend on attributing human features to all living things.
Anthropomorphic attributions permeate Schweitzer's
writings, such as when he says that all organisms suffer,9
that a beetle is capable of "rejoicing in the sun like
you,"(R 115) and that each organism "strives" to achieve
its highest perfection.(C 282) But anthropomorphism
is especially prominent in the will-to-live argument., and
it makes the argument seem utterly naive, as the
following summary indicates.
I am a will-to-live, with desires for self-preservation,
self-perfection, pleasure, happiness, and avoiding pain.
All other organisms have these same desires, feelings,
and aspirations: "As in my own will-to-live there is a
longing for.... pleasure, with dread of annihilation and
wider life and for.... pain; so is it also in the will-tolive all around me."(C 309) Therefore, since I value
my life I must (in consistency) value all other life, "for
I shall know that it longs for fulness and development
as deeply as I do myself."(L 230)
The obvious rejoinder is that most organisms do not
have desires like mine, whether for gaining pleasure
and avoiding pain or for self-survival and selfperfection. Pleasure and pain are conscious states, and

II. Empathy with Life
(without Anthropomorphism)
An adequate ethical theory, according to Schweitzer,
meets several general criteria.
1. It provides a unifying perspective on moral
values.(C 105)

Between the Species

206

Fall 1993

Rethinking Reverence for Life

plants and protozoa lack the neurological structures for
having or desiring conscious states. Moreover, desiring
self-survival and self-perfection implies having a
conception of oneself, a self-consciousness, that plants
and most animals lack. Even ascribing a will-to-live to
plants and lower animals seems anthropomorphic
insofar as a "will," at least in one literal sense, implies
conscious intentions, desires, and beliefs.
How can we explain Schweitzer's seemingly naive
anthropomorphism? As a physician and scientist, he was
well aware that plants and lower animals lack the
requisite neurological structures for consciousness.
Clearly he was influenced by Goethe and other
romantics who in their poetry personified nature, but
how could a well-trained scientist be so apparently
credulous in responding to that influence?lO
Much of the explanation is his metaphysics. If each
organism is literally part of a universal Will-to-live, and
if the basic features of that universal will are uniform
in all living organisms, then anthropomorphism is
virtually inevitable, especially if we begin by rel1ecting
on our own will-to-live. This tendency to anthropomorphize, however, is blocked once we set aside the
metaphysics. There is little temptation to make literal
ascriptions of human properties to algae and protozoa
if they are no longer regarded as instantiations of a
universal and personified will to live.
Another part of the explanation, however, is that
Schweitzer may not have been as naively anthropomorphic as first appears. ll We can construe his
anthropomorphic images as metaphors designed to
evoke empathy with other life, rather than as literal
ascriptions of human features to nonhuman organisms.
Whether or not this was his primary intention, it invites
a more serious examination of the will-to-live
argument. Let us strip away the anthropomorphic
images, retaining only the idea of a will-to-live
understood as a literal reference to genetically-driven
instincts to survive and develop. The following
argument emerges.(O 155-8)
1. Will-to-Live Thesis: "I am life that wills to live in
the midst of life that wills to live."
2. Definition: My will to live is defined by instinctive
tendencies to survive and develop.
3. Self-Affinnation Thesis: When I am healthy and
sincere towards myself, I feel reverence for my
will to live: I affmn my will-to-live, as defined in
(2), as having inherent worth, and I devote myself
to its expression, preservation and development.
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4. Analogy: All other organisms have similar
tendencies to survive and develop.
5. Empathy Thesis: I experience empathy with other
life as I reflect honestly, dwelling on its similarity
to my life.
6. Life-Afftrmation Thesis: My empathy generates
sympathy, caring, and a "compulsion" (a strong
desire and felt obligation) to approach other life
with the same reverence I feel for my life.
7. Conclusion: Reverence for life is a fundamental
virtue that consists in "preserving life, promoting
life, developing all life that is capable of
development to its highest possible value" and in
not "destroying life, injuring life, repressing life
that is capable of development."
This argument is phenomenological or experiencebased. It proceeds by reflecting on our experiences of
our instincts to survive and develop, our affmnation of
our lives inherent in those instincts, and our experience
and knowledge of those same instincts in other life.
Notice also that the conclusion is a statement about a
virtue, not a rule of conduct. To be sure, reverence for
life is a mandatory virtue, a virtue that we ought to
cultivate and that embodies obligations. But it is a
character trdit, a desirable attitude and disposition, rather
than a principle of action per se.
This interpretation captures Schweitzer's insistence
that ethics is a product of reasoning that reveals how
our attitudes toward all life should be "of a piece with"
attitudes toward ourselves.(L 230) It also captures his
conviction that reverence for life is a natural
expression of our will-to-live: "I can do nothing but
hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me manifests
itself as will-to-live which desires to become one with
other will-to-live."(C 312). Our inclination to contribute
to other living things expresses our desires for selffulfillment. We achieve "self-perfection through selfdevotion": self-fulfillment through exercising and
expanding our natural capacities for empathy and
sympathy for other life.(C 255)
The crux of the argument is the experience of
empathy of a kind that inspires sympathetic concern
for other life. This appeal does not make Schweitzer's
ethics human-centered. Empathy is a response to other
life as like us, but just as much a response that we are
like other life, at the fundamental level of shared dri ves
to survive and develop.
Schweitzer does not use the word "empathy" as
frequently as "sympathy," but he does use various
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phrases to convey the idea. Reverence for other life
begins when one experiences that life "in" one's own
life, "feeling as one's own all the circumstances and all
the aspirations of the will-to-live."(O 157, C 311)
Empathy does not imply sharing the feelings and desires
of the organisms we empathize with, and hence it is not
based on anthropomorphic ascriptions of feelings and
desires to all life. It is also broader than compassion,
which is a sympathetic response to the suffering of
sentient creatures.(C 311) Empathy means identifying
with other life, at least at the level of shared tendencies
to survive and develop within the range of possibilities
made possible by circumstances and genetic inheritance.
But the identification must involve a degree of concern
sufficient to develop naturally into sympathy and caring.
Is the will-to-live argument sound? Not in the sense
of providing a knock-down proof. Nevertheless, the
argument is far from being silly. It is provocative and
relevant to contemporary environmental ethics. Here
are some of the problems which need to be confronted
in assessing the argument.
Contrary to premise (5), not all of us experience
empathy for all life forms. What then? Schweitzer can
only try to generate, intensify, and expand empathy. One
way is by asking us to reflect further on similarities
between our will-to-live and other organisms' instincts
to survive and develop. Another way is to urge us to
recall occasions when we felt moments of union and
kinship with nature (of the sort listed earlier). Still
another way is to use anthropomorphic metaphors to
evoke empathy and sympathy.
Even if we do come to the point where we
experience a "compulsion" to feel empathy with all
other life, as premise (6) suggests, perhaps that
compulsion should be resisted. Desires and feelings of
obligations can be misguided. Just because they are
natural does not mean they are justified. Thus, even if
(6) states a fact, there is a contestable move to the valuestatement in (7) about a worthy ideal of character. The
move involves an "is-ought" gap: If there is a
compulsion to feel reverence for life, how does that
establish that we ought to cultivate it, or that it is the
most fundamental virtue? Still, if we do come naturally
to experience a strong desire to revere life, this
experience is certainly relevant to the conclusion. It
bears on matters of personal identity, integrity, and
fidelity to our experiences of unity with life.
Questions about personal identity retUl11 us to
premises (1) and (2): Does our will to survive and
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develop define us in some basic way? Schweitzer
insists the most "elemental" (basic, immediate)
discovery is of ourselves and other life as sharing a willto-live whose essence is to survive and develop. He
chastises Descartes for beginning with an empty
abstraction, "I think, therefore I am." "To think means
to think something," and the most primordial thought
to emerge from introspection is that I am a will to live
amidst other wills to live.(O 156) Yet, introspection can
only uncover what our conceptual schemas predispose
us to uncover. Descartes' conceptual framework
predisposed him to 'discover' a thinking substance,
whereas Schweitzer's metaphysical framework
predisposed him to discern a will to live among other
such wills. At the same time, perhaps premises (1) and
(2) will survive in some form within a contemporary
sociobiological framework that does not rely on
Schweitzer's metaphysics.
Is premise (3) true? Does sincerity toward ourselves
lead us to affirm our will-to-live at the "elemental" level
indicated? "Sincerity" implies honesty with oneself, but
it also implies being "true to oneself' and maintaining
"fidelity with oneself."(C 78, 282; L 230) It implies a
fundamental self-affirmation by bringing to consciousness an instinctive desire to survive and develop.(O 157)
The deepest level of self-affirmation does seem to be
an outgrowth of instinctive will to live. This bedrock
affmnation is not based on specific features of ourselves,
nor even our general capacities as humans. If it is as
primordial as Schweitzer suggests then it gives some
cogency to the will-to-live argument.
The will-to-live argument omits, however, that we
value ourselves and other humans for additional reasons
beyond our instinctive will-to-live. We affmn ourselves
at many levels, including at the level of specific
characteristics (our interests, accomplishments,
relationships, virtues, etc.) and generic properties (our
general human capacities). In these respects we are not
comparable to all other life, and our full worth turns on
things beyond the instinctive drives we share with all
life. That is relevant in understanding how to act when
confronted with conflicts between our lives and others,
or between killing one life to save another, topics to
which I turn next.
In short, there are difficulties with the will-to-live
argument, but nevertheless the argument carries some
force, especially when its appeal to empathy is
combined with the unity-of-life experiences mentioned
earlier. It may tum out that we do discover within us an
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decisions.(O 236, L 233) As it stands, the idea of
arbitrary decisions about killing is a dead end (no pun
intended). What led to this impasse?
Schweitzer offers two reasons against ranking life
forms, each of which is interesting but inconclusive.(O 235) First, ranking encourages abuses and
callousness, such as dismissing some fonus of life,
whelher "primitive peoples" or endangered species, as
being worthless and destroyable at whim. This is a
genuine problem, but it can be resolved by exercising
good moral judgment based on sound reasoning and
caring. Second, he insists that rankings cannot be
justified in tenus of differential roles of life fonus in
the universe, since we lack knowledge of any such
cosmic roles. Perhaps, however, we mightjustify at least
rough guidelines about the differential treaunent of life
forms by reapplying Schweitzer's own appeals to
empathy, as I will suggest in a moment.
I believe that the real reason why Schweitzer refuses
to rank life forms or offer priority rules is his
metaphysics. If each organism is a sacred part of a
universal and semi-deified Will-to-live, then it would
seem blasphemous to grade or rank them, either as
individuals or as members of species. It would also
follow that killing any life is sacrilegious. If we set aside
the metaphysics, are there perhaps other aspects of
Schweitzer's ethics that provide some guidance about
when killing is justified?
Schweitzer boldly set forth a virtue (or character)
ethics before it became fashionable to do so. Now,
according to long-standing objections, virtue ethics as
too vague and provides insufficient guidance; it
encourages subjectivity and even arbitrariness.
Aristotelians offer a two-fold reply. First, the virtues
do provide significant guidance, especially when they
are carefully sorted out and applied. Aristotle sorted
the virtues according to particular areas of conduct and
feeling where they function as a reasonable guide
between excess and defect. Contemporary virtue
ethicists have developed more subtle approaches to
clarifying the meaning and application of specific
virtues. Second, while rules playa role in moral conduct,
they are not enough. The essential factor in difficult
situations is good judgment-practical wisdom. Good
judgment is a product of proper upbringing, breadth of
experience, and nuanced moral sensitivity, rather than
a mechanical application of rules.
Because Schweitzer does not openly follow
Aristotle's lead, he is especially vulnerable to the charge

empathetic desire to identify with and care for other
life, a desire that is as natural ("healthy," "sincere") and
deeply-rooted ("elemental") as our self-affirmation. If
so, it seems likely that empathy will be a key ingredient
in any non-human-centered ethicsY

III. Moral Guidance (versus Arbitrariness)
In saying that all life deserves reverence, Schweitzer
did not claim that all life has equal value, and he was
usually careful not to assert moral equality among all
living things (whatever that would mean). At the same
time, he consistently refused to rank the value of
different species and types of life. The ethical person,
he tells us, "does not ask how far this or that life deserves
one's sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond that,
whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life
as such is sacred to him."(C 310) Yet, as Schweitzer
also emphasizes, we cannot live outside nature's cycle
of killing. Even to breathe or to take a walk is to kill
micro-organisms, and often we must save one life by
destroying others. What guidance, then, does he offer
about killing versus preserving life?
Schweitzer tells us we must kill only when
"necessary" and that determining when killing is
necessary involves "subjective" and "arbitrary"
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of being excessively subjective or even vacuous. I 3 He
fails to make prominent a conception of good judgment
in making decisions, and at least at first glance he tries
to reduce all virtues to one: reverence for life. In doing
so his ethics may gain inspirational force, but it loses
the fine-tuning of Aristotelian approaches.
In reply, we can note that the surface simplicity of
Schweitzer's ethics belies an underlying complexity.
He is not trying to reduce all virtues to one. Instead,
like most virtue-ethicists, he seeks an organizing
framework for the virtues. Ethics needs a focus in a
central ideal of character, since "the mere giving of a
list of virtues and duties is like striking notes at random
on the piano and thinking it is music."(C 105) But nor
do all virtues dissolve into one grand virtue of
reverence for life. On the contrary, the ideal of
reverence for life yokes together (without blurring)
specific virtues, including forgiveness, self-control,
tolerance, justice, and especially compassion,
gratitude, and sincerity with oneself (honesty with and
fidelity to oneselO. 14
These virtues can and do conflict, creating familiar
moral dilemmas whose resolution requires good
judgment. Indeed, anyone of these virtues can point in
different directions. Compassion requires supporting
sentient life, but it can also require ending it: "In many
ways it may happen that by slavish adherence to the
commandment not to kill compassion is less served than
by breaking it. When the suffering of a living creature
cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by
killing it mercifully than it is to stand aloof." 15 Passages
like this imply a conception of good moral judgment in
exercising the virtues, even though thatjudgment cannot
be neatly encapsulated in rules.
While Schweitzer sometimes claimed that reverence
for life is a comprehensive moral principle, in other
places he denied. it. His theory is primarily about
individual rather than social ethics.(C 245) Thus he
could write: "My idea of reverence for life is not meant
to guide the African in striving for his own and his
nation's freedom. It is meant to get him to deal with
more than himself in the spiritual world.... "16 This is a
revealing statement. Reverence for life implies a
deepened respect for human rights,(C 328) but
understanding the complex interplay of rights in
international affairs will require an exploration of more
specific moral principles than his ideal of reverence for
life can provide by itself. 17 Similarly, we might think
of reverence for life as the primary ideal for individuals

Between the Species

in morally relating themselves to life while acknowledging that matters of public policy concerning the
environment need to involve more focused rules.
Why did Schweitzer leave so much leeway for
individual interpretations in applying the ideal of
reverence for life? Although he claims to have
uncovered the ultimate foundation for ethics, we can
view him as responding to the needs of a particUlar
time-though a time not altogether unlike our own.
Writing in the aftermath of World War I, he saw a crisis
in Western civilization. The crisis was manifested in
the devaluation of human life btn rooted in the forces
of mass society. Most people, he charged, are "lost in
the mass" and prevented from working out their own
convictions, whether due to overwork, overspecialization, or control by governments, corporations, and
churches.(C 17) To counterbalance these forces, each
of us must engage in personal reflection on moral values
and respect the similar efforts of others. Accordingly,
an adequate ethics must be flexible, open, and tolerant.
It will be individualistic and overcome traditional
ethicists' "downright fear of what cannot be subjected
to rules and regulations."(C 291) A creative ethics of
altruism will have a "fluid indefiniteness" that embraces
innumerable avenues for caring.(C 166, 320)
This spirit of flexibility is attractive, but can an
environmental ethic reasonably forgo all rankings of
life forms? I do not see how. Perhaps we should heed
Schweitzer's advice to avoid abstract cosmological
rankings, but we do and must implicitly use rankings
when we make decisions about the differential treatment
of species in cases of conflicting interests. Indeed,
Schweitzer himself sometimes implies there are good
reasons for valuing organisms differentially according
to the forms oflife possible for them. He clearly implies
that sentient creatures have a moral status unlike that
of plants and nonsentient animals. He devotes special
attention to arguing against killing sentient creatures
for pleasure: bull fighting, cock fighting, and hunting
for sport. I 8 And he in veighs against misuse of sentient
animals in medical experiments and in teaching science.
No similar pronouncements are made about experiments
on plants. Even if we avoid saying sentient animals have
greater inherent worth than other animals, clearly the
implication is that sentient animals make special claiins
on us (as do humans).
Does Schweitzer's ethical theory leave any room
for making the rankings he disavows? Retum to the
frrst premise in the will-to-live argument: "I am life
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which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to
live." Even if we grant that the most basic fonn of selfaffinnation is afflnnation of our willeto-live, and even
if we agree that at this level we share a kinship with all
life, we also discover dissimilarities between our will
LOdive and other organisms once we turn from
introspection to inspection of the world. Depending on
the organism, the dissimilarities will be striking (as
with plants and lower animals) or less striking (as with
higher mammals). Rarely will they justify eradication
of a species (as with the polio and AIDS viruses), but
they will justify the'commonsense conviction that
humans have greater inherent worth than algae. They
will also justify cherishing chimpanzees more highly
than chiton, because oftlle former's more sophisticated
mental and social life.
Does reverence for life permit eating sentient
animals or does it require vegetarianism? The refusal
to make differential judgments about life fonns prevents
us from grasping this question as urgent in the way that
Schweitzer himself did toward the end of his life. 19 If
cows and cabbage are equally sacred, why should eating
the one raise greater moral qualms than eating the other?
Once we recognize moral differences between sentient
and nonsentient life, especially as we attend to the
suffering inflicted on sentient creatures in modem meat
production, the issue becomes important within an
ethics of reverence for life, even though that etilic does
not by itself settle the issue. .
Also consider Schweitzer's conduct. He helped a
wounded osprey by choosing to kill. fish to feed it.
Although he insisted that such choices are arbitrary,
most of us see a good reason in the unique features of
the osprey and in its rarity, compared to the abundance
offish. We justify special efforts to preserVe endangered
species, rather than treating each living organism as on
a par with every other. Even if we share Schweitzer's
hesitation to make abstract rankings of life forms, we
can understand his stories about saving one animal by
sacrificing others as parables of good judgment in
"necessary" killing.
What, after all, is necessary killing? Schweitzer
suggests we can kill nonhuman life
a. in self-defense,
b. as an inevitable part of legitimate activities, such
as when we crush microorganisms by going for a
walk, and
c. in order to save human lives, as when a physician
kills dangerous microorganisms.(C 316)
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These pronouncements qualify as moral rules, however
rough. 2o As such they call for justification, presumably
in tenns of the greater value of a human life compared
with dangerous microorganisms.
Rethought along these lines, Schweitzer's ideal of
reverence for life remains somewhat vague (or
creatively open), but hardly vacuous. After setting aside
his metaphysics, we can maintain the spirit of flexibility
and personal discretion in his ethics while taking into
account the fonns of life possible for them. Schweitzer
repeatedly insisted that we must stop killing thoughtlessly, that we must think before we kill. He should
have insisted that we think well, that we exercise good
moral judgment-but he implied as much.

IV. Responsibility (without Guilt Mongering)
Contemporary ethics is preoccupied with complex
moral dilemmas. Schweitzer, by contrast, was preoccupied with motivation and with finding an ethics
that inspires moral commitrnwt and enthusiasm.(C 299)
Reverence for life is an ideal of character that
"penetrates unceasingly and in all directions a man's
observation, reflection, and resolutions" in devotion to
life.(C 316) It is absolute in the sense that it can never be
fully achieved, given that to be alive is to participate in
some killing.(L 232) Yet that very absoluteness evokes a
higher moral pitch in everyday emotion and conduct.
This emphasis on high moral aspiration was
distorted by his occasional preoccupation with guilt. I
am guilty, he says, each time I kill any living thing, no
matter what my motive: "Whenever I in any way
sacrifice or injure life, I am not within the sphere of the
ethical, but I become guilty, whether it be egoistically
guilty for the sake of maintaining my own existence or
welfare, or unegoistically guilty for the sake of
maintaining a greater number of other existences or their
welfare."(C 325) For Schweitzer, then, "necessary"
killing does not mean justified killing. Nor does it mean
killing which is wrong but excusable, so as remove guilt.
To kill is to be culpable. We are "murderers" when we
kill a mosquito and "mass murderers" when we kill
bacteria.(C 316-7)
These are extraordinary claims! Admittedly, they
have a certain authenticity insofar as they flow from
Schweitzer's metaphysics. 21 If each organism is
sa{''fed, then killing it is tantamount to desecrating the
sacred, rendering one guilty. But consistency is one
thing; cogency is another. Schweitzer's metaphysics is
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a recipe for guilt mongering, which is my final reason
for setting it aside.
Does setting the metaphysics aside diminish the high
demands contained in reverence for life? There is some
danger, of course, that the demands may be too great.
Schweitzer placed enormous pressure on himself and
seemed to find his feelings of guilt a helpful source of
motivation. 22 Most people, however, would be crushed
by comparable feelings of guilt.
Surely we can respond to a call for greater
responsibility for life without being drawn into
excessive guilt. In its core meaning, responsibility
means trying to act responsibly and being morally
accountable, that is, susceptible to being called to
account for our conduct in terms of good moral
reasons. 23 When those reasons are sound and sufficient.
killing is justified and (at least often) no guilt is
involved. In particular, there is no guilt-none
whatsoever-when a physician like Schweitzer killed
bacteria by sterilizing surgery instruments or when
patients take antibiotics. Nor is there guilt when we eat
vegetables and nonsentient animals (leaving aside the
controversy over eating sentient animals).
That does not mean we should never feel bad when
we justifiably participate in killing. Regret is often
appropriate. Regret is the appropriate emotion when we
reasonably wish we did not have to take life, by contrast
with guilt for unjustified killing. Regret can be mild or
intense, and it can be accompanied by strong feelings
of sadness, grief, and even horror. (Think of euthanizing
a beloved pet whose suffering from cancer can no longer
be lessened in other ways.) In addition to being focused
on specific acts of killing, regret can be a general
response to our immersion in the cycle of killing.
If we reassert common sense in justifying "necessary"
killing, have we abandoned the spirit of reverence for
life? Surely not. Reverence for life includes reverence
for our own lives, as manifested in justifiable selfdefense. Understandably and admirably, Schweitzer
wanted to avoid an ethic of expediency in which human
concerns automatically override the interests of other
life forms. But in doing so he established a misleading
dichotomy between "ethical and necessary," such that
taking life is unethical even when necessary to protect
other life.(C 325) This dichotomy is inconsistent with
his own insistence that the ethical includes reverence
for oneself as manifested in self-defense and selfdevelopment. It is also inconsistent with his belief that
devotion to other life sometimes requires killing for its
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sake. To be consistent, Schweitzer should say that the
ethical includes necessary killing, not contrasts with it.
To conclude, Schweitzer's metaphysical vision
contributed to the boldness with which he set forth a
biocentric ethics over half a century before most
philosophp.rs began to struggle with his issues. That
metaphysics distorts some of his central ideas, yet the
key elements in his ethics survive intact after his
metaphysics is set aside. Those elements include unity
of life, empathy for other living organisms based on
shared instincts, a flexible virtue-guided perspective
focused in a (complex) ideal of reverence for life, and
responsible commitment to furthering life while being
sensitive to differences among life forms. 24
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